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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH ANSELMO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 14578 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Joseph Anselmo, appeals from 
a judgment of conviction and sentence thereon entered 
against him in the Third Judicial District Court for the 
crimes of kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant Joseph Anselmo was convicted by a jury 
of the crimes of kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault on 
April 1, 1976, after a two-day trial. Sentence of the court 
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was pronounced on April 1, 1976, ordering Appellant to 
serve the indeterminant term as provided by law of o to 5 
years for kidnapping and five years to life for aggravated 
sexual assault, the terms to run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Joseph Anselmo seeks reversal of 
the court below as to the judgment entered on the convic-
tion of aggravated sexual assault. Appellant does not 
appeal from his conviction for the crime of kidnapping. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 20, 1975, Laura Margaret Lund 
received a phone call from a past acquaintance and went 
to meet her at a Salt Lake City restaurant. (Tr. 29-
31) Laura Margaret Lund met several people for the first 
time that night including Appellant Joseph Anselmo at his 
apartment on Fourth South in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 35) 
She testified that she talked with Appellant and he wanted 
her to be his "old lady" and she said she was not interested 
in such a proposition but that she would go to a party that 
night at a friend's house just as a friend. (Tr. 38,39) 
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She testified that after arriving at the home 
of "J.T." (Martin Hayes) approximately eight people were 
there engaging in drinking and listening to music. (Tr. 40-
44) 
Shortly thereafter Laura Margaret Lund testified 
that Anselmo took her to a side bedroom in the home and 
tried to kiss her and make other advances. There was a 
conversation about Laura Margaret Lund having said she 
wanted to go to the party as a friend only and then appellant 
said he had changed his mind about that. (Tr. 48) Laura 
Margaret Lund testified that she yelled that she wanted 
to leave and Anselmo hit her in the face with his fist 
and said she could not leave and she was to be his "old 
lady". (Tr. 50,51) 
Laura Margaret Lund testified that after being 
hit by Appellant Anselmo her eyes were blackened and her 
face swollen. (Tr. 60, Exhibit 15, 16) 
After being struck Laura Margaret Lund went 
to another room and shortly thereafter Appellant Anselmo 
came in and hit her with his fist again in the face and took 
her to the side room. (Tr. 52,53) In the side bedroom 
again a struggle ensued with Appellant Anselmo trying to 
-3-
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remove Laura Margaret Lund's clothing and she struggling 
to free herself. (Tr. 54,55) At that point Laura Margaret 
Lund testified that defendant got on his knees.above her 
and held one hand at her throat and pulled his other fist 
back but said nothing. (Tr. 58) At that point she testi-
fied that she did not want to get hurt and she submitted 
to an act of sexual intercourse with appellant. (Tr. 58) 
She slept in that room that night with appellant 
and the next day, November 21, Friday, she testified that 
she was taken to a back room by appellant and one Martin 
Hayes where she again testified that she was raped, after 
appellant said to her that she had better settle down or 
he would see that his man would take care of her. (Tr. 64, 
65) When asked what he meant, Martin Hayes hit the wall 
with a hanuner and said "That's what he means". 
Laura Margaret Lund testified that she remained 
in the home until Monday evening, November 24, 1975. (Tr. 74) 
She testified that she sneaked out Monday evening and spoke 
with police officers two days later on November 26. 
The complaining witness was examined by a 
physician on November 25 and he, Dr. George Hinckley, 
testified that she had bruises and abrasions about her 
-4-
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eyes (Tr. 126), but he could neither confirm nor deny an 
act of intercourse due to various factors. (Tr. 129, 131) 
At the end of the State's case, appellant moved 
to reduce Count II of the information, charging aggravated 
sexual assault, to simple rape on the grounds that the State 
had not proved the necessary threats had been made to 
prove aggravated sexual assault, but that the matter should 
go to the jury only on the lesser included offense of simple 
rape. (Tr. 135-139) The motion was denied by the court. 
(Tr. 142) 
Appellant Anselmo did not deny any acts of 
intercourse with Laura Margaret Lund but testified that 
his having hit her was over an argument concerning something 
other than whether she would submit to sex and he testified 
that he did not force her to commit any sex act. 
186) 
(Tr. 184-
The jury returned verdicts of simple kidnapping, 
a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping as 
charged in the information, and guilty of aggravated sexual 
assault as charged in Count II of the information. (Tr. 220, 
R. 491,412) 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE COUNT 
II OF THE INFORMATION AT THE END OF 
THE STATE'S CASE FROM THE CHARGE OF 
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT AS CONTAINED 
IN THE INFORMATION TO THE LESSER IN-
CLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE RAPE BECAUSE 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE NECESSARY 
ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT. 
Under our recent criminal code rape is defined 
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-402 as an act of 
sexual intercourse with a female not the actor's wife, 
without her consent. "Without her consent" is defined 
in Section 76-5-406 in several ways, the only ones which 
have relevance in this case being subsection 1 or subsection 
2. Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-55-406 says an act of 
sexual intercourse is without consent when the actor compels 
the victim to submit or particpate by any threat that would 
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution. 
so, if a person threatens another so as to overcome resistance 
in a person of ordinary resolution, any following act of 
sexual intercourse is without consent and if the victim is 
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not the wife of the perpetrator, it is an act of rape. 
For an act of rape to rise to a first degree 
felony under Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-405, aggra-
vated sexual assault, the actor, in the course of a rape, 
must either cause serious bodily injury or compel the sub-
mission to the rape by a "threat of kidnapping, death, or 
serious bodily injury to be inflicted iminently." That is, 
a threat must be one of kidnap, death, or serious bodily 
injury (defined in 76-1-601 as "bodily injury that creates 
or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss 
or ~pairment of the function of any bodily member or organ 
or creates a substantial risk of death) to be taken out of 
the general category of threats [76-5-406 sub(2)J so as 
to negate consent and to rise to the level of a threat 
that is over and above that necessary to amount to a threat 
compelling submission to the rape and thus be an aggravated 
sexual assault. 
Threats that overcome the resistance of aperson 
of ordinary resolution, when used to accomplish sexual 
intercourse, can get one convicted or rape. Our legislature 
then indicated that to be convicted of the more serious 
-7-
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offense of aggravated sexual assault, a first degree 
felony, the threats that compel submission to the rape must 
be specific and not of a general type that would overcome 
the resistance of a person of ordinary resolution. That is, 
a specific threat of kidnapping, death, or serious bodily 
injury must be made. Clearly our legislature had in mind 
that in order to convict one of the more serious offense 
of aggravated sexual assault, a more serious threat than 
one that overcomes resistance of a person of ordinary 
resolution must be made. 
In this case there was no evidence of a specific 
threat to kidnap Laura Margaret Lund, cause her death, or 
to inflict serious bodily injury upon her immediately. 
Laura Margaret Lund testified that she had been 
hit in the face by appellant with his fists and later that 
same night appellant pulled back his fist as if to hit her 
while holding her with the other hand. (Tr. 58) That is 
clearly a threat, one that may well overcome the resistance 
of a person of ordinary resolution and thus any following 
act would be without her consent. However, appellant 
contends that it is clearly not a threat of kidnapping or 
-8-
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death. As the term "serious bodily injury" is defined it 
is also equally clearly not a threat of iminent serious 
bodily injury; that is, permanent disfigurement or a 
substantial risk of death. This becomes clear when compar-
ing Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-405 (2) with 76-5-405, the 
aggravated sexual assault statute. What the aggravated 
sexual assault statute has in mind in terms of threats 
is serious threats with weapons of a very violent potential, 
not threats to inflict injury by hand. Any threat of 
violance by bare hand would probably qualify as a threat 
within 76-5-406(2), one that overcomes resistance, but the 
aggravated sexual assault statute must mean some conduct 
that is more severe than a threat to do injury by bare hand. 
Bodily injury is defined in 76-1-601 as physical pain 
or injury and the legislature could have put that term in 
sub-paragraphs (a) (ii) of 76-5-405 but it shows a term 
instead that includes within its definition an injury that 
could have a substantial risk of death. Appellant contends 
that a threat under the aggravated sexual assault statute 
must be much more severe than one that was shown in this 
case, that is, a threat to hit someone in the face with a 
-9-
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bare hand. 
To contend otherwise would be to contend there 
is no such thing as simple rape, because whenever an act of 
sexual intercourse occurred with a female not the wife 
of the actor and any kind of threat occurred, that would 
amount to aggravated sexual assault if the term "threat" 
within 76-5-405(a) (ii) is extended to mean a threat to do 
something with one's bare hands. 
As such, the State failed to prove a threat 
within the aggravated sexual assault statute but instead 
only proved a threat which would fit within 76-5-406 (2) 
and so appellant should not have had the jury consider his 
guilt on the charge of aggravated sexual assault but instead 
only on the lesser included offense of rape. 
Of course, aggravated sexual assault can occur 
when in the course of the rape the actor causes serious 
bodily injury to the victim. As discussed above, appellant 
contends that the defined term "serious bodily injury" 
requires much more severe injury than was evidenced in this 
case. In this case Laura Margaret Lund suffered black eyes 
and a bruise behind her left ear. (Tr. 60, 126, Exhibit 15, 
16). The term "bodily injury" covers that sort of injury 
-10-
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and the tenn serious bodily injury is reserved for those 
injuries which create a substantial risk of death. There-
fore, the State having failed to show that Appellant Anselmo 
caused serious bodily injury or compelled submission to an 
act of sexual intercourse by threat of kidnapping, death, 
or serious bodily injury to be inflicted iminently, the 
case should not have gone to the jury on that charge and 
the court below erred in so allowing the jury to consider 
the charge of aggravated sexual assault and so appellant is 
entitled to a reversal of his conviction as to Count II of 
the infonnation. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED INFAILING TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION 
DEALING WITH THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF 
RESISTANCE REQUIRED IN A RAPE CASE. 
In as much as Laura Margaret Lund testified 
that her only actual physical resistance consisted of some 
"struggling" (Tr. 57), appellant requested an instruction 
on the necessity of resistance on the part of the prosecutrix. 
(R. 473) That instruction requested was as follows: 
-11-
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You are instructed that the woman 
must resist the force of violence 
or threats of immediate or serious 
bodily harm directed at her to the 
extent that seems reasonable under 
the circumstances. Mere passive 
resistance is not sufficient. Resis-
tance must be by acts and not by 
mere words. If a woman objects 
verbally to the act of intercourse, 
but by her conduct consents to it, 
the element of lack of consent has 
not been shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt and you must acquit the defend-
ant. Fu~ther, if her opposition appears 
after a period of apparent consentual 
behavior, that opposition to amount 
to resistance sufficient to constitute 
the lack of consent element of the offense, 
must be such that a reasonable man 
under the circumstances would have no 
question but that consent was being 
withheld. If you do not find such 
resistance beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must acquit. 
The court failed to give Appellant Anselmo's 
proposed instruction No. 10 and he duly objected. (Tr. 218) 
In State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168 (1949) this 
court reversed a conviction for rape where the jury during 
deliberations returned with a question concerning a similar 
instruction as proffered in appellant's case. In that case 
the pertinant portion of the instruction given by the trial 
court and approved by this court was as follows: 
-12-
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.••. that said Pearle resisted 
the said act of sexual intercourse, but 
her resistance was overcome by force or 
violence exerted by said defendant. 
You are instructed that the word 
resistance as used in these instruc-
tions, does not require that the said 
Pearle should have made the 
uttermost resistance. The law requires 
that the woman do what her age, strength, 
the surrounding facts and all attending 
circumstances make it reasonable for 
her to do in order to manifest opposition 
to the act of sexual intercourse. Any 
objections in words, or such objections 
coupled with some resistance are not 
enough to make the acts of the accused 
or either of them constitute rape. The 
resistance required by the law is such 
resistance as the said Pearle 
was capable of making at the time and 
under the circumstances there existing. 
Appellant Anselmo contends that in this case where 
there was clearly at least a battery conunitted by Appellant 
Anselmo upon Laura Margaret Lund but nowhere in the record 
is any real resistance shown by her except verbally that 
the proffered instruction was necessary to inform the jury 
that earnest resistance was required. 
The court defined aggravated sexual assault in 
Instruction 23 (R. 437) and the crime of rape in Instruction 24 
(R. 438) In order to determine the meaning of those terms 
-13-
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the jury was of course required to refer to the definition 
"without consent" in Instruction No. 25 (R. 439). In 
Instruction No. 25 the court told the jury that an act of 
sexual intercourse is without consent of the victim when, 
among other things, the actor compels the victim to submit 
or participate by force that overcomes such earnest resis-
tance as might reasonably be expected under the circumstances. 
That sub-paragraph is of course taken from the definition 
in U.C.A. 76-5-406 (1). In Instruction 26 (R. 440) the 
court attempted to discuss what amount of resistance is 
required. However, under the facts of this case where the 
slight resistance offered was merely verbal an instruction 
such as that approved in State v. Beeny, supra, is more 
appropriate than the court's Instruction No. 26. (R. 440) 
Such instruction as the court gave would be appropriate 
where there was testimony that there was physical resistance 
overcome by force but Laura Margaret Lund nowhere in her 
testimony indicated that she physically resisted. As such 
the court committed error which affected the substantial 
rights or Appellant Anselmo requiring a reversal of his 
conviction for aggravated sexual assault. 
-14-
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POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GIVING AN 
INSTRUCTION UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND WHICH TENDED TO CONFUSE 
THE JURY. 
The court in Instruction No. 25 (R. 439) defined 
the term "without consent" in three sub-paragraphs, the 
first two of which did have applicability to the facts of 
this case. 
Paragraph 3 stated "the victim has not consented 
and the actor knows that the victim is unconscious, unaware 
that the act is occurring, or physically unable to resist." 
That subsection is taken from 76-5-406(3) as one of the 
possible ways in which an act of sexual intercourse can be 
without the consent of the victim. However, in this case, 
there was absolutely no evidence that the victim was 
unconscious or unaware of what was occurring or physically 
unable to resist. 
It is clear that a court is not to give instruc-
tions on abstract principles of law not supported by the 
evidence. See, for example, State v. Chealey, 100 U 423, 
116 P.2d 377 (1941); State v. Rivenburg 11 U.2d 95, 355 P.2d 
639 (1960). In State v. Thompson, 110 u. 113, 170 P.2d 
-15-
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153 (1946), this court stated the rule above and went on to 
say, 170 P.2d 162: 
[the court is notJ to instruct on any 
question which is not involved the 
case under the evidence. We think 
that it cannot be too strongly empha-
sized that the court should apply the 
law to the facts as they appear from 
the evidence, and should instruct only 
on the law which has a bearing on the 
facts. 
Appellant contends that Instruction No. 25 
which was objected to by appellant (Tr. 219) should not 
have been given because there was no evidence to support 
that portion of the instruction. An instruction which has 
no support on the record, even though it may be a correct 
statement of an abstract proposition of law, is improper 
when there is no support for it in the evidence and it is 
grounds for reversal if it is calculated to mislead the 
jury. People v. Moore, 43 Cal. 2d 513, 275 P.2d 485 (1954). 
Appellant Anselmo contends that in light of the circumstances 
of this case the giving of this portion of the instruction 
misled the jury and was prejudicial and reversable error. 
The last phrase of sub-paragraph 3 in Instruction 
-16-
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No. 25, "or physically unable to resist" clearly has in 
mind the situation related to the first phrases of that 
paragraph. That is, when a victim is unable to move or 
unconscious or under the influence of drugs or in some 
manner unaware of what is occurring after having been 
knocked unconscious or for some other reason totally 
physically unable to resist such an instruction would be 
appropriate. However, in this case, the jury could have 
easily been misled to believe that Laura Margaret Lund was 
physically unable to resist because she had been hit in the 
face by Appellant Anselmo. In State v. Pacheco, 27 U.2d 
45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1972), this court reversed a conviction 
for grand larceny and gave the defendant a new trial 
saying that it was impossible for this court to "Presti-
digitate whether the jury convicted defendant of larceny 
or aiding and abetting, under the record in this case". 
So also in this case this court cannot say whether the 
jury found either that Laura Margaret Lund submitted 
because her resistance was overcome by force or whether she 
sumbitted to sexual intercourse because of threats or whether 
the jury mistakenly believed that she was physically unable 
-17-
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to resist as that term was set forth in Instruction No. 25. 
There was simply no evidence to support the giving of that 
portion of Instruction No. 25 and it is impossible for this 
court to say that the jury did not rely on that portion of 
the instruction and for the reasons advanced in Pacheco, 
supra, Appellant Anselmo is entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that the court 
erred in submitting the case to the jury on the offense 
of aggravated sexual assault as charged in Count II of the 
information, and erred in the giving of certain instructions, 
appellant respectfully submits that the case should be 
remanded for a new trial as to the judgment entered on 
Count II of the information. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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